Indian calculus in Myanmar
With the recent coup d’état in the neighbouring country, Indian security calculus does not get unduly upset, moral posturing aside
Seen from the prism of values and sovereign moralities, the tripping of democracy by the Junta in Myanmar should concern India. Seen from the prism of realism, realpolitik and practical leverages, the change of governance in Myanmar really doesn’t matter. While this realisation may be morally untenable, lessons from history would remind India that it has suffered more than gained whenever it defined bilateral relations on the basis of “moral” position, viz; formalising ties with Israel as late as in 1992. A more nuanced approach of retaining “moral” positions is practised by democracies like the US, who have no qualms in allying with autocratic Sheikhdoms in the Middle East, whilst still posturing for democratic reforms therein — basically, fronting “national interest” over enthusiasm for democracy or liberality in other regimes.
Whereas such overt romance with ideological concerns led India to publicly support the supposedly pro-democracy moorings of Aung San Suu Kyi for decades, much to the consternation of Myanmar’s Junta who faced no such conundrum in dealing with China, alternatively. Importantly, even though the Junta had perennial suspicion of China meddling in its ethnic-based insurgencies such as the United Wa State Army (as opposed to harbouring any such concern towards India) — the “moral” intransigence expressed by India and, conversely, the ease of doing business with China ensured the relative comfort of dealing with Beijing for the Junta. The vanity and inefficacy of India’s misplaced “morality” in foreign policy was obvious when Suu Kyi barely reciprocated India’s unstinted support to her, during her days in the Opposition, as she was coldly practical and transactional in persisting with the China tilt as it served her interests better vis-à-vis India, “morality” be damned.
The “opening up” of the economy in the early 1990s had a spillover impact beyond the realm of economics as it ushered in a governance culture of much-needed pragmatism and “self-interest”, which expanded into Indian diplomatese. In 2004, Junta strongman Gen Than Shwe visited India and signed an assurance that “Myanmar would not permit its territory to be used by any hostile element for harming Indian interests”. Even from a deeply hyphenated Indo-Chinese perspective of one-upmanship, Than Shwe had expressed categorical support to India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The murmurs of Chinese “influence” notwithstanding, the Junta was conversant with the Chinese tact of keeping the kettle boiling along its restive borders with Myanmar to have a constant leverage in Naypyidaw. India perceptibly harboured no such expansionist instincts. Soon the Junta denied oxygen to multiple India-facing insurgent groups along the 1600-km Indo-Myanmar border, a crucial step that aided the quelling of various North-eastern insurgencies. Than Shwe returned to India in 2010, reconfirming the “balance” achieved in Indian diplomacy to handle its own interests along with ideological posturing seamlessly.
In 2011, Than Shwe passed on the Junta’s leadership to his protégé Gen Min Aung Hlaing, who navigated the delicate transition to democracy while still holding key levers. Aung Hlaing visited India in 2017 and confabulated extensively with its security establishment. By now, Indians had realised the parallel and irreplaceable heft of the Myanmar Generals, concurrently with its civilian Government. Since then, India upped its military sales, investments and engagements with Myanmar. Last year, India gave it a prized Kilo-class submarine that had been refitted, the first ever supply of such a platform from India to any country. The Myanmar Military (Tatmadaw) acknowledged and reciprocated India’s overtures, in the full know of its larger intent to checkmate China from making deeper inroads. Thereafter, a rare combined visit by the Indian Army chief and the Foreign Secretary to Myanmar was suggestive of the deliberate outreach, irrespective of the brewing turf wars between the Myanmar Generals and the civilian Government. Now the Tatmadaw has shed all pretences of running a parallel show and ended the diarchy.
Beyond the hoopla surrounding the 2015 surgical strike against insurgent groups based in Myanmar, the clear understanding with the Junta had resulted in similar strikes in 1995 and 2006, and a formal agreement facilitating cross-border access had been signed in 2010. Myanmar is keen to focus its military attention and redeploy troops on its anti-insurgency operations in the Northern and Eastern borders with China, which hosts most of the anti-Myanmar groups. However, China’s stakes and investments in Myanmar remain unmatched and, unlike India, it does not shy away from taking an amoral position in favour of Naypyidaw, such as boycotting talks on the Rohingya issue in the Security Council. Yet, despite China’s continued beneficence, Myanmar remains sceptical of Beijing’s game. India had come a long way in understanding the region’s fragility and in the merits of retaining the equation with forces like the Junta. Additionally, the Indian Army chief has tenured personally in Myanmar as India’s Defence Attaché and therefore would be well versed with the local dynamics and stakeholders. With the recent coup d’état in Myanmar, Indian security calculus does not get unduly upset, moral posturing aside.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views expressed are personal.)
Source: The Pioneer
